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ABSTRACT: 
 
Without doubt, higher performance is the ultimate objective of any business entity while 
minimizing the risk and informing the investors the transparent information of the business.  In 
this paper we show a new way of thinking that will fulfill the ultimate interests of the banks due 
to the efforts of management such as being higher market value of the firms, taking less risk and 
providing higher level of disclosure for the stakeholders in general and the shareholders, in 
particular. We use simultaneous relationship among market performance, risk and disclosure 
quality of twelve Malaysian listed banks over a period of ten years from 1996 until 2005.  
Tobin’Q, standard deviation of monthly stock return and weighted disclosure score are analyzed.  
Three theories, namely, signaling theory, risk and return theory and market discipline theory are 
tested and only market discipline theory is found to be significant indicating that banks are 
highly regulated compared to other industries, especially in terms of risk factors and information 
disclosure. 
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1.0 Introduction 
  
 It is undeniable that higher performance and transparency of information disclosure with 
lower risk is one of the essential interests of the investors.  Many researchers have done the 
research on the relationship between market performance and risk, market performance and 
disclosure as well as risk and disclosure.  However, to our knowledge, no study has been done to 
examine the simultaneous relationship among market performance, risk and disclosure.  
Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine the simultaneous relationship among performance, 
risk and disclosure of the banks since theories such as signaling theory, capital asset pricing 
model and market discipline theory point out the existence of the possible relationship among 
them.  
 Accordingly, the question which comes under research is "Is there any simultaneous 
relationship among market performance, risk and disclosure of Malaysian listed banks?" In this 
study, listed banks are chosen as a sample because banking sector is riskier than other business 
sectors due to its nature of business activities and furthermore, banking sector is highly regulated 
compared to other business sector, especially in information disclosure. In terms of market 
performance, there is no exception for banking sector to have better market performance.  At the 
same time, risk is also an important factor that banks are required to manage (Basel Committee 
on banking supervision, 2005; Alexander, 2006; Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez, 2008).    
 Furthermore, some of the factors that motivate to conduct this research is the unique 
nature of Malaysian banking sector, compared to most of the developed countries where most of 
the researchers have conducted their research.  This unique nature of Malaysian situations may 
have positive impact on one aspect of the banks while imposing negative impact on the another 
aspect.  Thus, it is believed that it is essential to examine the simultaneous relationship among 
crucial expectations, i.e. performance, risk and disclosure quality of listed banks, of the investors 
in Malaysia. 
 
 According to Lia (2004), the agency problem in Malaysia is between the minority and 
majority shareholders, not between directors and shareholders like in UK.  Due to the ownership 
concentration, performance of the banks might be good however, transparency in disclosing 
information might not be encouraged since block shareholders might have their own proxies in 
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the management from which they can get inside information.  In addition, family ownership 
issue is an important issue in Malaysia since it will have the similar effect like block ownership 
since the decision of the companies will be biased towards the families’ interests rather than that 
of the companies.  The implementation of the New Economic Policy or Bumiputra Policy results 
in a significant shift in the balance of ownership towards the bumiputra ownership and finally, it 
increases the involvement of governmental and political influence into the business environment 
in Malaysia by including prominent bumiputras such as ex-bareaucrats or politicians, on their 
boards, in many Chinese companies and conglomerates (Singam, 2003; Htay, 2012). 
 
This paper is organized in six sections.  Section 2 explains literature review.  Section 3 focuses 
on the development of hypotheses and research design.  Section 4 elaborates on preliminary 
finds.  Section 5 discusses on findings of simultaneous equation and the last section concludes. 
 
2.0 Literature Review  
 
 This study examines the simultaneous relationship among market performance, risk and 
disclosure quality of the annual reports.  Three theories which highlight the existence of potential 
relationship are explained below. 
 
2.1 Risk and Disclosure: Market Discipline Perspective 
  
 The managers are the persons who are actually conducting the business activities and 
they have more knowledge about the companies compared to the investors.  Investor cannot 
know the real financial position of the companies, i.e. information risk, if management does not 
disclose all the material aspects of the companies.  Due to this separation of ownership and 
control, the information asymmetry exists.  Hence, it could be assumed that higher level of 
existence of information asymmetry is the more risky of the investments since the investors do 
not know the actual financial position of the companies.  The best way to reduce the information 
asymmetry or information risk is disclosing all the material aspects of the companies (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001; Chiang, 2005; Bassen, Kleinschmidt, and Zollner (2006).  By doing so, the 
investors are able to monitor the management, to estimate the current and future financial 
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position of the companies, and to discipline the management if it does not meet investors’ 
expectation.  
 Kwan (2004) defines market discipline as “the effects of publicly available market 
signals from bank-issued securities that lead to less risk taking by the issuing bank” and further 
explains that market participants and bank regulators could influence a bank’s risk profile by 
monitoring these market signals, consequently it will constrain bank risk taking.  Hence, market 
discipline could be described as a mechanism that allows the market participants to monitor the 
performance of the companies through the disclosure of information and the investors are able to 
discipline the companies if they do not meet investors’ expectation.  In the banking sector, there 
are three main types of investors who might discipline the banks.  They are equity holders, 
unsecured debt holders and uninsured deposit holders (Nier & Baumann, 2006).  If the 
performance of the banks does not meet the expectation, equity holders may sell their share 
interest; influence to change the management and to introduce compensation performance. 
Moreover, unsecured debt holders and uninsured deposit holders may ask for higher return.   
 Therefore, it can be summarized that due to market discipline, higher disclosure will lead 
to lower information asymmetry, and consequently lower risk (Baumann & Nier, 2004; Chen, 
Chen and Wei, 2004; Jensen et al., 2006).  This theoretical expectation is supported by the 
findings of Nier and Baumann (2006), and Baumann and Nier (2004).  Furthermore, Gilbert 
(n.d.) mentions in the article that the results of Beighley, Boyd and Jocobs (1975), Pettway 
(1976), Beighley (1977), Pettway (1980), Brewer and Lee (1986), Cornell and Shapiro (1986), 
Shome, Smith, and Heggestad (1986), James (1987), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987), Gorton and 
Santomero (1988), Hannan and Hanweck (1988), and James (1989) are consistent with the 
effectiveness of market discipline.  This means that their findings show market participants are 
able to discipline the companies if they do not meet their expectation. 
 
2.2  Risk and Performance: Capital Asset Pricing Model (Risk and Return) Perspective   
 
 According to Brigham and Houston (2001: 229), “the concept of return provides 
investors with a convenient way of expressing the financial performance of an investment”.  It is 
because, if the performance of the companies is good, the return that the investor might receive 
will be high and if the performance is poor, the return will be low.  Thus, it can be summed that 
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when the investors receive higher return, they may believe that the performance of the 
companies is good.   
 As a rational investor, if he has to face higher risk, he will expect higher return or 
performance in order to compensate the higher risk he bears (Richardson, 1970).  This concept is 
derived from the capital asset pricing model, which is “an equation that equates the expected rate 
of return on a stock to the risk-free rate plus a risk premium for the stock’s systematic risk” 
(Keown, Martin, Petty and David, 2003: 274).  This model basically shows a positive 
relationship between the risky assets and their respective returns.  Therefore, from this model, it 
could be derived that the investors expect that higher the risk is, the more return for them and the 
better performance of the companies.  This theoretical expectation is supported by the study of 
Tang and Shum (2004) and Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2005). Tang and Shum (2004) 
who study monthly return of stocks from the Pacific Basin Capital Markets Database from April 
1986 to December 1998 find that there is a significant positive relation between beta and return.  
Ghysels et al. (2005) find a significantly positive relation between risk and return in the stock 
market.   
 
2.3 Performance and Disclosure: Signaling Theory Perspective 
 
 As mentioned before, there is a potential existence of information asymmetry due to the 
separation of the ownership and control because managers as the insiders of the companies know 
the actual performance of the companies, whereas investors basically know what is revealed by 
the managers.  Based on the information disclosure, the investors make their economic decisions.  
Hence, the disclosed information should be comprehensive enough in presenting all the material 
aspects of the companies in order to ensure that the investors can make the right decisions.  
 As investors are rational decision makers, they would like to choose the investment that 
will give them the maximum return.  In the decision making process, the investors will rely on 
the information available to them that is supplied by the management of the companies.  The 
managers definitely prefer the investors to invest in their companies.  Hence, the management 
might disclose the positive information in order to persuade the investors that the investment in 
their company security is better than others.   This concept is derived from the signaling theory, 
i.e. if the companies are performing well; they prefer to disclose more in order to have positive 
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impression on their companies (Spence, 1973).  Bird and Smith (2005) assert in their paper based 
on the idea of the signaling theory that the signalers communicate the observers by symbolic 
communication which shows the hidden attributes of the firms and consequently it will provide 
the benefits to both signaler and observers.  Hence, it could be expected that there should be a 
positive association between firm performance and disclosure (Jensen et al. 2006) since it could 
be predicted that healthy firms are most likely to disclose more information than the distressed 
firms (Norita & Shamsul Nahar, 2004).  The theoretical expectation is supported by the findings 
of Mitton (2002) and Chiang (2005).   
 
3.0 Development of Hypotheses and Research Design 
 
3.1 Development of Hypotheses 
  
 Since the theories such as market discipline, capital asset pricing model and signaling 
theory have highlighted the possible relationship among the dependent variables, i.e. 
performance, risk and disclosure, the hypotheses are developed based on the above mentioned 
theories. 
 
3.1.1 Development of Hypothesis on the Simultaneous Relationship among Risk, 
Performance and Disclosure  
 
 Capital asset pricing asset model shows a positive relationship between the risky assets 
and their respective returns.  Therefore, from this model, it could be derived that the investors 
expect that the higher the risk is, the more the returns for them and the better performance of the 
companies.  This theoretical expectation is supported by the study of Tang and Shum (2004) and 
Ghysels et al. (2005).   
 In addition, according to the signaling theory, if the companies are performing well; they 
prefer to disclose more in order to have positive impression on their companies (Spence, 1973).  
Hence, the management might disclose the positive information in order to persuade the 
investors that the investment in their company security is better than others.  The theoretical 
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expectation is supported by the findings of Mitton (2002) and Chiang (2005). Based on the above 
mentioned two theories, the following null hypothesis is developed. 
Hd1: There is no indirect effect of risk on disclosure through performance.   
 
3.1.2 Development of Hypothesis on the Simultaneous Relationship among Performance, 
Disclosure and Risk 
 
 The signaling theory highlights that there is a tendency for the company to disclose more 
information if the performance of the companies is good in order to gain positive impression 
from the investors (Spence, 1973).  Hence, the management might disclose the positive 
information in order to persuade the investors that the investment in their company security is 
better than others.  The theoretical expectation is supported by the findings of Mitton (2002) and 
Chiang (2005). 
 Market discipline could be described as a mechanism that allows the market participants 
to monitor the performance of the companies through the disclosure of information and the 
investors are able to discipline the companies if they do not meet investors’ expectation.  
Therefore, it can be summarized that due to market discipline, higher disclosure will lead to 
lower information asymmetry, and consequently lower risk (Baumann & Nier, 2004; Chen et al., 
2004; Jensen et al. 2006).  This theoretical expectation is supported by the findings of Nier and 
Baumann (2006) and Baumann and Nier (2004).  Based on the above mentioned two theories, 
the following null hypothesis is developed. 
Hd2: There is no indirect effect of performance on risk through disclosure.  
 
3.1.3 Development of Hypothesis on the Simultaneous Relationship among Disclosure, 
Risk and Performance 
  
 Based on the Market discipline theory, it can be inferred that higher disclosure will lead 
to lower information asymmetry, and consequently lower risk (Baumann & Nier, 2004; Chen et 
al., 2004; Jensen et al. 2006).  This theoretical expectation is supported by the findings of Nier 
and Baumann (2006), and Baumann and Nier (2004).   
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 Capital asset pricing asset model highlights a positive relationship between the risky 
assets and their respective returns.  This theoretical expectation is supported by the study of Tang 
and Shum (2004) and Ghysels et al. (2005).   Based on the above mentioned two theories, the 
following null hypothesis is developed. 
Hd3: There is no indirect effect of disclosure on performance through risk.   
 
3.1.4 Development of Simultaneous Equations to Examine the Relationship among Risk, 
Performance and Disclosure 
 
 Three models will be developed to examine the simultaneous relationship among risk, 
performance and disclosure.  The first simultaneous equation based on capital asset pricing 
model and signaling theory is as follows:  
Y1 = (βo + β1 Y2+ β2 x1+β3 x2 + β4 x3+ β5 x4+β6 x5+ β7 x6 + β8 x7 + β9 x8 + β10 x9 + β11x10 + µit) vs Y3 = 
(βo + β1 Y1+ β2 x1+β3 x2 + β4 x3+ β5 x4+β6 x5+ β7 x6 + β8 x7 + β9 x8 + µ) 
The second simultaneous equation based on signaling theory and market discipline is as 
follows: 
Y3 = (βo + β1 Y1+ β2 x1+β3 x2 + β4 x3+ β5 x4+β6 x5+ β7 x6 + β8 x7 + β9 x8 + µ) vs Y2 = (βo + β1 Y3+ β2 
x1+β3 x2 + β4 x3+ β5 x4+β6 x5+ β7 x6 + β8 x7 + β9 x8 + β10 x9 + β11x10+ µ) 
The third simultaneous equation based on market discipline and capital asset pricing 
model is as follows: 
Y2 = (βo + β1 Y3+ β2 x1+β3 x2 + β4 x3+ β5 x4+β6 x5+ β7 x6 + β8 x7 + β9 x8 + β10 x9 + β11x10 +µ) vs Y1 = (βo 
+ β1 Y2+ β2 x1+β3 x2 + β4 x3+ β5 x4+β6 x5+ β7 x6 + β8 x7 + β9 x8 + β10 x9 + β11x10 +µ) 
 Where, Y1 = Performance; Y2= Risk; Y3= Disclosure; x1= Board leadership structure; x2= 
Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board; x3= Board size; x4= Proportion 
of director ownership; x5= Proportion of institutional ownership; x6= Proportion of block 
ownership; x7= Log of total assets; x8= Leverage; x9= Gross domestic product growth rate; x10= 
Economic crisis variable and µ= Error term 
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3.2 Research Design 
 
 The sample includes twelve companies whose main business activity is banking and 
which are listed on Bursa Malaysia.   Period of study is from 1996 until 2005.  Variables used in 
this study are Tobin’s Q, standard deviation of monthly stock return and weighted disclosure 
score.  Some of researchers who use Tobin’s Q as a market performance measure are Khaled and 
Mohamed (2007), Garg (2007), Nazrul Hisyam et al. (2007), Dahya et al. (2008) and Raja and 
Kumar (2008).  Standard deviation of monthly stock return is an important measure for market 
risk and among the researchers who use standard deviation of monthly stock return includes Nier 
and Baumann (2006), Stever (2007) and Cheng (2008).  Weighted disclosure score is measured 
by the disclosure index developed based on the rules and regulations governing the banks, by 
regulating institutions like Bank Negara Malaysia, Basel Committee on banking supervision, 
statement on internal control issued by the institute of internal auditors Malaysia for public listed 
companies and prior researchers such as Sang (2005), Wong (2005) and Perrini (2006).  The 
disclosure check list includes two hundred and twelve items which are mixture of both voluntary 
and mandatory items.  In order to provide weight on each disclosure item, depending on the level 
of importance, a set of questionnaire is constructed and distributed to the accountants and 
financial analysts to seek their opinion on the level of importance of disclosure items from the 
index. 
 Other control variables are total assets as a proxy for firm size and ratio of total debt to 
total equity to measure leverage. In addition, gross domestic product rate and economic crisis 
period are used to control the general macroeconomic situations in the country because the 
sample period includes the economic crisis periods, i.e. 1997 and 1998.  The purpose of 
controlling these two variables is to avoid any influence of economic crisis on the findings.   
 Simultaneous equation method is adopted to find the relationship among performance, 
risk and disclosure quality in this study. 
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4.0 Preliminary Findings 
 
4.1 Profile of Respondents and the Reliability Test 
 
Weighted disclosure score is computed after seeking the opinions of accountants and 
financial analysts and so Table 1 shows the background information about the respondents.  The 
information includes gender, educational background, employment category, age and working 
experience of the respondents.  Overall, both male and female respondents are equally 
distributed (49 percent of the respondents are male and 51 percent are female). Regarding 
educational background, the majority of the respondents are bachelor degree holders, and the 
balance is professional certificate holders. Since 57 percent of the respondents are from audit 
firms and 43 percent are from non-audit firms, the opinion is not influenced by a particular 
group. In terms of group age, the majority is between 20 and 29 years, followed by 30 and 39 
years. In terms of working experience, majority of the respondents i.e. 43 percent are below 30 
years in their current profession and 23 percent have working experience between three to seven 
years.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
  
Table 2 presents the results of the reliability test.  The results show that the minimum Alpha 
value is 0.87 from the overall results and so it could be concluded that the respondents’ answers 
are reliable.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics results of the variables used in this study.   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
In case of BLS, its mean value (0.81) shows that majority of the companies have separate 
leadership structure although the minimum value (zero) shows that there are companies which 
have combined leadership structure.  The MCCG (2001) recommends the companies to have 
separate leadership structure.  Hence, it could be summed that the majority of the sample 
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companies follow the recommendation provided by the MCCG (2001).  In addition, the 
graphical presentation of the means of BLS over the period from 1996 to 2005 can be referred to 
Graph 1.  Based on the graph, the means of BLS increases until 2002 and later on, it remains 
constant.  It seems that in terms of BLS, the sample companies seem to adopt separate leadership 
structure especially after the introduction of the MCCG (2001). 
 
[Insert Graph 1 about here] 
 
Regarding board composition, the MCCG (2001) recommends that at least one third of 
the board members should be INE_BZ.  The mean value (0.36) of shows that, on the average, 
INE_BZ of sample companies is more than one third of the total number of the directors on the 
board.  Thus, it could be summed that the board composition of the majority sample companies 
is in line with the recommendation provided by the MCCG (2001).  Moreover, the graphical 
presentation of the means of INE_BZ over the period from 1996 to 2005 can be referred to 
Graph 2.  Based on the graph, the means of INE_BZ keep on increasing until 2005 and hence, it 
could be inferred that the sample companies have more INE_BZ after the introduction of the 
MCCG (2001). 
[Insert Graph 2 about here] 
 
With regard to BZ, the MCCG (2001) does not provide the exact number of BZ although 
the importance of the independence of the board from the management is highlighted.  
According to the survey conducted by KLSE/Pricewaterhouse Coopers survey indicated that the 
average board size is 8 for the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance, 2007).  Mak and Li (2001) by referring to Jensen (1983) and Florackis 
and Ozkan (2004), mention that boards with more than about seven to eight members are 
unlikely to be effective.  They further elaborate that large board results in less effective 
coordination, communication, and decision making, and are more likely controlled by the CEO.  
Hence, the mean value (8.23) of BZ shows on average, the sample companies have relatively 
larger BZ.  The graphical presentation of the means of BZ over the periods of 1996 to 2005 can 
be referred to Graph 3.  Based on this graph, started from 2002, the board sizes slightly decrease 
until 2004 and in 2005, BZ slightly increases.  Hence, in general, it could be concluded that 
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board size slightly decreases after the introduction of the MCCG (2001) because the mean BZ of 
2005 is smaller than that of 2001. 
 
[Insert Graph 3 about here] 
 
For ownership, the mean values of DOWN and IOWN are 0.02 and 0.17.  Thus, on 
average, no significant number of shares is owned by directors and institutions.  In the case of 
BOWN, its mean value (0.53) shows that the significant portions of the shares are owned by 
large shareholders.  The graphical presentations for the DOWN, IOWN and BOWN can be 
referred to Graph 4, 5 and 6.  From the graphs over the periods of 1996 until 2005, it can be 
found that not significant number of shares belong to DOWN and IOWN except for BOWN. 
Regarding ownership issue, the MCCG (2001) does not provide any guidelines.  Hence, it cannot 
be concluded that whether ownership by directors, institutions and block holders becomes larger 
after the introduction of the MCCG (2001).  However, based on the corporate governance 
literature, specifically based on the agency theory, higher director ownership, institutional 
ownership, and block ownership have the potential to have better performance and lower risk.  In 
the case of better disclosure, smaller director ownership, larger institutional ownership and larger 
block ownership are preferred.   
[Insert Graph 4, 5 & 6 about here] 
 
The means values of Tobin’s Q (0.18),  standard deviation of monthly stock returns, STD 
(0.67) and weighted disclosure score (321.91) are presented in Table 3.  Their graphical 
presentations of the yearly means can be referred Graph 7, 8 and 9.   
 
[Insert Graph 7, 8 & 9 about here] 
 
 Based on the literature, performance, risk and disclosure could be affected by size and 
ratio of debt to equity of the company (i.e. leverage condition) and economic condition of the 
country.  Hence, these variables are controlled in this study.  Their descriptive statistics results 
can be referred to Table 3.  On average, the sample companies have the means values of 
RM45992.19 millions for total assets (TA), 344.727 for ratio of total debts to total equity 
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(TD_TE) and 0.084517 for gross domestic product (GDP) rate.  Their graphical presentations 
can be referred to Graph 10, 11 and 12. TA keeps on increasing over the years from 1996 until 
2005.  In the case of the mean values of TD_TE, they significantly decrease in 2001 but for the 
rest of the years, the mean values are above 300 and seems to be high.  It might be due to the fact 
that the main activity of the sample companies is banking activity which heavily involves 
borrowing and lending activities, compared to trading businesses. 
 
[Insert Graph 10, 11 & 12 about here] 
4.2 Correlation Results 
 
 Table 4shows the correlation among the variables.  Based on the correlation table, there is 
no variable which is highly correlated with the others.  None of the correlation coefficients is 
above 0.50.  This result provides on early indication that the problem of multicollinearity might 
not severely influence the regression results.   
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The correlation value between the BLS and BZ (-.39) indicates that companies with larger 
BZ tend to have combined BLS.  Thus, it seems that the CEO might have higher tendency of 
strong influential power on the board since the board size is larger and there is no separate 
individual body to oversee CEO.  The correlation value (-0.20) between BZ and INE_BZ shows 
that they are inversely related.  Hence, it can be inferred that when BZ is larger, the number of 
independent non-executive directors is smaller and consequently, lesser independence for the 
board from the management.    
The correlation between INE_BZ and DOWN is -0.12 and it means that higher the 
proportion of the director ownership, lower the ratio of independent directors.  Based on this 
correlation result, it seems that when the directors have interest in the companies, the board 
seems to have fewer number of independent directors and hence the independence of the board 
from the management will be lower. 
In the case of IOWN, its correlation value with BLS is (-0.05) and with INE_BZ is (-
0.26).  These correlation values mean that even at the existence of the higher IOWN, the 
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possibility of having combined BLS is higher and having the smaller number of independent 
directors is higher. Hence, it could be inferred that the role of the institutional shareholders in 
Malaysia is weak.  It also might be due to the fact that institutions do not have significant 
ownership interest since the mean value of institutional ownership is only seventeen percent. 
 
5.0 Simultaneous Equation Results 
  
 Three sets of simultaneous equations are run based on three theories.  The first set of 
simultaneous equation is based on capital asset pricing model and signaling theory and results 
are presented in Table 5 (Panel A).  The second set of simultaneous equation is based on 
signaling theory and market discipline and results are presented in Table 5 (Panel B).  The third 
set of simultaneous equation is based on market discipline and capital asset pricing model and 
results are presented in Table 5 (Panel C). 
 
5.1 Simultaneous Equation Results among Risk, Performance and Disclosure 
  
Based on the concept of capital asset pricing model, as a rational investor, if he has to face higher 
risk, he will expect higher return or performance in order to compensate the higher risk he bears 
(Richardson, 1970; Keown et al., 2003).  Therefore, from this model, it could be derived that the 
investors expect that the higher the risk is, the more the returns for them and the better 
performance of the companies.   
As investors are rational decision makers, they would like to choose the investment that 
will give them the maximum return.  In the decision making process, the investors will rely on 
the information available to them that is supplied by the management of the companies.  As 
managers of the companies, they definitely prefer the investors to invest in their companies.  
Hence, the management might disclose the positive information in order to persuade the 
investors that the investment in their company security is better than others.   This concept is 
derived from the signaling theory, i.e. if the companies are performing well; they prefer to 
disclose more in order to have positive impression of their companies (Spence, 1973).  Hence, in 
theory, it could be expected that there should be a positive association between firm performance 
and disclosure (Jensen et al. 2006).   
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 Based on the results in Panel A of Table 5, it could firstly be concluded that risk is not an 
important determinant of performance.  In the first half of Panel A (Table 5), it is found that 
BLS, IOWN, BOWN and LNTA and CRISIS are important determinants of performance.  
However, majority of the significant relationships contradict the theoretical expectations.  For 
example, it is expected that separate BLS would lead to better performance, however, the results 
shown otherwise.  Similar results can also be observed on IOWN and BOWN.  It might be due to 
the use of Tobin’s Q as the measure of performance.  Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for market 
performance since the formula to calculate Tobin’s Q includes the market value of common 
stock which captures the extent to which the stock market values the firms’ shares.  Most of the 
researchers such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Yermack (1996) and Raja and Kumar (2008) 
use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for market performance in the corporate governance research area. 
 With regard to the control variables, it is expected that larger firms should have better 
performance.  However, the results show otherwise.  One possible reason might be that larger 
banks are already matured with lesser business opportunities.  As performance indicator used for 
the simultaneous equation is Tobin’s Q, it is possible that the relationship is negative.  With 
regard to crisis, it confirms the theoretical expectation where during the period of economic 
crisis, performance of banks becomes poorer. 
 In the second half of Panel A (Table 5), the second estimation results in better fitness of 
the first equation.  It could be observed that the Chi
2
 of the second estimation (i.e.429.69) is 
much better than the first estimation (i.e. 150.62).  In addition, it could also be observed that the 
effect of performance and disclosure becomes much better, with z-value of 1.78, compared to the 
direct effect of performance on disclosure (i.e. z-value of 1.28, refer to the first half of Panel B 
results).   Therefore, it could be concluded that simultaneous equations results in better 
estimation of the effect of performance on disclosure.  Although risk is not a significant 
determinant of performance, it helps in improving the effect of performance on disclosure under 
the simultaneous framework. 
 
5.2 Simultaneous Equation Results among Performance, Disclosure and Risk 
  
 Based on the signaling theory, if the companies are performing well; they prefer to 
disclose more in order to have positive impression on their companies (Spence, 1973).  Hence, in 
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theory, it could be expected that there should be a positive association between firm performance 
and disclosure (Jensen et al. 2006).   
In the modern business environment, corporations face a lot of market uncertainties, such 
as market risk, credit risk and operational risk.  One of the main factors leading to all these risks 
is the problem of information asymmetry.  Thus, it could be assumed that higher level of 
existence of information asymmetry is the more risky of the investments since the investors do 
not know the actual financial position of the companies.  The best way to reduce the information 
asymmetry or information risk is to disclose all the material aspects of the companies (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001; Chiang, 2005; Bassen et al., 2006).  By doing so, the investors are able to monitor 
the management, to estimate the current and future financial position of the companies, and to 
discipline the management if it does not meet investors’ expectations.   Therefore, based on the 
market discipline, investors will be able to monitor the performance of the companies through 
the disclosure of information and discipline the companies if they do not meet investors’ 
expectations.  In theory, it can be summarized that due to market discipline, higher disclosure 
will lead to lower information asymmetry, and consequently lower risk (Baumann & Nier, 2004; 
Chen et al., 2004; Jensen et al. 2006).   
Based on the results in Panel B of Table 5, it could firstly be concluded that performance 
is not an important determinant of disclosure.  In the first half of Panel B (Table 5), it is found 
that INE_BZ, BZ, DOWN, BOWN and LNTA are important determinants of performance.  
However, two of the significant relationships contradict the theoretical expectations.  For 
example, it is expected that smaller BZ would lead to better disclosure, however, the results 
show otherwise.  Similar results can also be observed on BOWN. 
 With regard to the control variables, it is expected that larger firms should have higher 
disclosure and the finding from LNTA is in line with the expectation.  However, the result from 
leverage, i.e. TD_TE, shows otherwise.  One possible reason might be that banks with more 
debts are less likely to disclose more information so as not to reveal their actual financial 
position. 
 In the second half of Panel B (Table 5), the second estimation results do not improve the 
fitness of the first equation since the Chi
2
 of the second estimation (i.e.883.95) is much lower 
than the first estimation (i.e. 5820.64).  However, p-value of both estimations is still highly 
significant.  In addition, it could also be observed that the direct effect of disclosure on risk is 
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very much lower, with z-value of -0.17 (refer to the second half of Panel B results), compared to 
the direct effect of disclosure on risk (i.e. z- value of -3.09, refer to the first half of Panel C 
results).   Therefore, it could be generally concluded that performance is not a significant 
determinant of disclosure and it does not really help in improving the effect of disclosure on risk 
under the simultaneous framework. 
 
5.3 Simultaneous equation results among disclosure, risk and performance 
  
 Based on the market discipline, investors will be able to monitor the performance of the 
companies through the disclosure of information and discipline the companies if they do not 
meet investors’ expectation.  In theory, it can be summarized that due to market discipline, 
higher disclosure will lead to lower information asymmetry, and consequently lower risk 
(Baumann & Nier, 2004; Chen et al., 2004; Jensen et al. 2006).  According to the concept of 
capital asset pricing model if the risk is high, the investors expects more returns and better 
performance of the firms.   
Based on the results in Panel C of Table 5, it could firstly be concluded that disclosure is 
an important determinant of risk at z-value of -3.09.  In the first half of Panel C (Table 5), it is 
also found that BLS, GDP rate and economic crisis are important determinants of performance.  
However, the significant relationship of BLS with risk is contrary to the theoretical expectations.  
In the second half of Panel C (Table 5), the second estimation results in better fitness of the first 
equation.  It could be observed that the Chi
2
 of the second estimation (i.e.1254.72) is much better 
than the first estimation (i.e. 946.19).  Therefore, it could be concluded that simultaneous 
equations results in better estimation of the effect of risk on performance.  Disclosure is a 
significant determinant of risk and it helps to improve the effect of risk on performance under the 
simultaneous framework. 
 
6.0  Conclusion and Area for Future Research 
  
 This paper examines the relationship among market performance, risk and disclosure 
quality of the twelve Malaysian listed banks using simultaneous equation.  In Malaysian context, 
the applicability of the concept of market discipline theory seems to be significant.  It might be 
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due to the following reasons. First, Malaysian banking industry is closely regulated by Bank 
Negara Malaysia.  Secondly, banks are also required to follow the specific guidelines issued by 
Bank Negara Malaysia in addition to the existing accounting standards in disclosing the 
accounting information.  Finally, Malaysian banks are required to observe the Pillar Three: 
Market Discipline issued by Basel Committee on Bank Supervision. Hence, it seems to improve 
the market’s ability to assess a bank’s risk and value.  
In the case of signaling, the findings are in line with the theoretical expectation although it 
is not significant (refer to the second half of Panel A & the first half of Panel B, Table 5).  
Therefore, the applicability of the concept of signaling theory is not significant.  It might be due 
to the following reasons.  First, the motive of information disclosure of the banks is based on the 
regulatory requirements by the Bank Negara, rather than the choices of the individual companies.  
It has been supported by the findings of Berglof and Pajuste (2005).  Secondly, weakness of local 
media in Malaysia might hinder the flow of information.  Some of the situations that make local 
media weak in Malaysia are as follows (Singam, 2003).  
Regarding the risk and return theory, the findings are not in line with the theoretical 
expectations and it is also not significant.  It might be due to the nature of banking business 
activities.  This research applies the theories which are developed based on the social and 
economic situations in developed countries.  Therefore, among the theories used in this study, 
only market discipline theory is significant and the main reason for it is highly regulated nature 
of banking industry.  Therefore, in future, the theory which is based on local culture, religion and 
market situation should be considered. 
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Table 1: Profile of Respondents 
 Accountants Financial Analysts Overall 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Gender       
Male 52 39.69 37.00 72.55 89.00 48.90 
Female 79 60.31 14.00 27.45 93.00 51.10 
Total 131 100.00 51.00 100.00 182.00 100.00 
Educational background       
Bachelor degree 74 56.92 25.00 50.00 99.00 55.00 
Master 6 4.62 19.00 38.00 25.00 13.89 
Ph.D   1.00 2.00 1.00 0.56 
Professional qualification 
(ACCA, CIMA, CFA, etc) 
50 38.46 5.00 10.00 55.00 30.56 
Total 130 100.00 50.00 100.00 180.00 100.00 
Employment category       
Audit firm 103 78.63 1.00 1.96 104.00 57.14 
Non-audit firm 28 21.37 50.00 98.04 78.00 42.86 
Total 131 100.00 51.00 100.00 182.00 100.00 
Age range       
Below 20       
20 – 29 63 48.09 11.00 21.57 74.00 40.66 
30-39 35 26.72 22.00 43.14 57.00 31.32 
40-49 27 20.61 14.00 27.45 41.00 22.53 
50-59 4 3.05 4.00 7.84 8.00 4.40 
60 and above 2 1.53   2.00 1.10 
Total 131 100.00 51.00 100.00 182.00 100.00 
Working experience 
with current profession 
      
Below 3 years 63.00 48.09 15.00 29.41 78.00 42.86 
3 – 7 29.00 22.14 13.00 25.49 42.00 23.08 
8 – 12 16.00 12.21 10.00 19.61 26.00 14.29 
13 – 17 15.00 11.45 7.00 13.73 22.00 12.09 
18 – 22 2.00 1.53 3.00 5.88 5.00 2.75 
23 – 27 2.00 1.53 3.00 5.88 5.00 2.75 
Above 27 4.00 3.05   4.00 2.20 
Total 131.00 100.00 51.00 100.00 182.00 100.00 
Additional information       
Masters   1.00 1.96 1.00 0.55 
Professional qualifications 
(ACCA, CIMA, CFA, etc) 
15.00 11.45 7.00 13.73 22.00 12.09 
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Table 2: Reliability Test Results: Actual Respondents 
 Alpha 
 Accountants 
Financial 
analysts Overall 
Disclosure on Strategic Information 0.92 0.86 0.90 
Disclosure on risk management 0.96 0.97 0.96 
Disclosure on Financial Information  0.92 0.93 0.93 
Disclosure in the notes to the accounts  0.95 0.96 0.96 
Disclosure on segmental information  0.92 0.91 0.92 
Disclosure on market share, contingent liabilities and 
assets, and other information  0.88 0.85 0.87 
Disclosure on Social, Environmental and Value 
Added Information 0.88 0.90 0.89 
Additional Disclosure on Operations of Islamic 
Banking 0.92 0.93 0.93 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent, Dependent and Control 
Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
(a) CG variables           
BLS 0.81 0.40 0.00 1.00 1.00 
INE_BZ 0.36 0.18 0.10 0.33 0.83 
BZ 8.23 2.34 4.00 8.00 14.00 
(b) Ownership variables      
DOWN 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.25 
IOWN 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.09 0.64 
BOWN 0.53 0.21 0.00 0.58 1.00 
(c) Market performance       
TOBIN'S Q 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.16 0.46 
(d) Risk            
STD 0.67 1.00 0.06 0.42 7.03 
(d) Disclosure score      
WDS 321.91 108.24 119.84 316.95 574.68 
(e) Other variables         
TA 45,992.19 40,245.92 1,120.36 33,326.95 191,895.30 
TD_TE 344.73 331.14 14.03 223.80 1,442.26 
GDP RATE 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.09 0.14 
 Note: WDS refers to weighted financial information disclosure score. 
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Table 4: Correlation Results 
  BLS INE_BZ BZ DOWN IOWN BOWN TA TD_TE 
GDP 
RATE 
DUM_ 
CRISIS
3
 
BLS 1.00          
INE_BZ 0.12 1.00         
BZ -0.39 -0.20 1.00        
DOWN -0.42 -0.12 0.41 1.00       
IOWN -0.05 -0.26 -0.03 -0.10 1.00      
BOWN -0.08 -0.36 -0.02 0.12 0.34 1.00     
TA -0.04 0.11 0.43 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 1.00    
TD_TE -0.37 -0.26 0.02 -0.02 0.15 0.14 0.32 1.00   
GDP RATE -0.01 0.12 -0.10 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.01 1.00  
DUM_CRISIS -0.07 -0.18 -0.07 0.14 -0.14 0.17 -0.15 -0.03 -0.24 1.00 
Note: The figures provided above are the correlation coefficients and none are significant at 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 DUM_CRISIS refers to economic crisis dummy. 
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Table 5 
Simultaneous equation results 
 
PANEL A         PANEL B         PANEL C       
(PERFORMANCE &. RISK)    (DISCLOSURE & PERFORMANCE)   (RISK & DISCLOSURE) 
vs.   vs.   vs. 
 (DISCLOSURE & PERFORMANCE)   (RISK & DISCLOSURE)   (PERFORMANCE & RISK) 
TOBIN'Q Coefficient Z_value P value   WDISCLSOURE Coefficient Z_value P value   STD Coefficient Z_value P value 
STD -0.10 -1.07 0.29   TOBIN'Q 95.17 1.28 0.20   WDISCLOSURE 0.00 -3.09* 0.00 
LNTA -0.08 -5.65* 0.00   LNTA 65.77 4.72* 0.00   LNTA 0.01 0.60 0.55 
TD_TE 0.00 1.79 0.07   TD_TE -0.01 -0.21 0.84   TD_TE 0.00 0.38 0.70 
GDP RATE 0.16 1.37 0.17   Chi2     5820.64*   GDP RATE -0.57 -5.5* 0.00 
DUM_CRISIS -0.04 -2.27** 0.02   P value     0.00   DUM_CRISIS 0.10 6.24* 0.00 
Chi2     150.62*           Chi2     946.19 
P value     0.00             P value     0.00 
WDISCLSOURE Coefficient Z_value P value   STD Coefficient Z_value P value   TOBIN'Q Coefficient Z_value P value 
TOBIN'Q 357.16 1.78 0.08   WDISCLOSURE 0.00 -0.17 0.87   STD -0.22 -0.60 0.55 
LNTA 88.35 4.07* 0.00   LNTA 0.01 0.07 0.94   LNTA -0.09 -5.45* 0.00 
TD_TE -0.03 -0.74 0.46   TD_TE 0.00 0.35 0.73   TD_TE 0.00 1.78 0.08 
Chi2     429.69*   GDP RATE -0.57 -5.18* 0.00   GDP RATE 0.12 0.53 0.60 
P value   0.00   DUM_CRISIS 0.09 1.81 0.07   DUM_CRISIS -0.03 -0.66 0.51 
        Chi2     883.95*   Chi2     1254.72* 
          P value     0.00   P value     0.00 
* Significant at 1%              
** Significant at 5% 
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Graph 1 
Means of board leadership structure from 1996 to 2005 
 
 
 
Graph 2 
Means of ratio of independent non-executive directors to the board from 1996 to 2005 
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Graph 3 
Means of board size from 1996 to 2005 
 
 
Graph 4 
Means of director ownership from 1996 to 2005 
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Graph 5 
Means of institutional ownership from 1996 to 2005 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6 
Means of block ownership from 1996 to 2005 
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Graph 7 
Means of Tobin’s Q from 1996 to 2005 
 
 
 
Graph 8 
Means of standard deviation of monthly stock returns from 1996 to 2005 
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Graph 9 
Means of weighted disclosure score from 1996 to 2005 
 
 
 
 
Graph 10 
Means of total assets from 1996 to 2005 
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Graph 11 
Means of ratio of total debts to total equity from 1996 to 2005 
 
 
Graph 12 
Means of gross domestic product rate from 1996 to 2005 
 
 
 
Means of Ratio of Total Debts to Total Equity (1996-2005)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
M
e
a
n
M eans of Ratio of Total Debts to Total Equity
GDP Rates (1996-2005)
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
G
D
P
 R
a
te
GDP Rates
